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JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT BILL
I INTRODUCTION
The publication of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
Fourteenth Amendment Bill on 14 December 2005,1 part of a package of
measures designed to rationalise the judiciary in terms of Schedule 6 of
the Constitution,2 elicited strong responses from civil society as the
constitutionally required 30-day period for public comment3 ran over the
height of the long summer holidays in South Africa. A second month for
public comment allowed by the parliamentary Justice Portfolio
Committee did little to stem the growing public opposition to the
content of the Bill. Eventually, criticism by the current and former Chief
Justices and prominent human rights lawyers,4 led the President to
intervene and the Portfolio Committee to delay the deadline for public
comment by two and half months to 15 May 2006.5
At the core of public and judicial criticism has been the concern that
the Constitution Amendment Bill, together with the Superior Courts
Bill,6 prejudice and limit the independence of the judiciary and the
constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers. Some of this has been
1 General Notice 2023 Government Gazette 28334 of 14 December 2005.
2 Section 16(6) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘the
Constitution’). These Bills include the Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill; the Superior
Courts Bill, the South Africa National Justice Training College Draft Bill; the Judicial Conduct
Tribunals Bill and the Judicial ServiceCommissionActAmendmentBill. The SuperiorCourts Bill
had previously been published for comment (Bill B52 of 2003) and the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa Amendment Act (Bill B60 of 2003) proposed changes to the structure of
theHigh Courts and the SupremeCourt of Appeal . The 2005 Bills substantially change aspects of
the 2003 Bills. Only the first two bills (ie, the Fourteenth Amendment Bill and the Tribunals Bill)
are currently in thepublic domain. TheNational JusticeTrainingCollegeBill has beenwithdrawn,
and the other two are pending. The text of the Bills and drafts is available at <http://
www.pmg.org.za>.
3 Section 74(5) of the Constitution requires a Bill amending the Constitution to be published in
the national Government Gazette at least 30 days before its introduction into Parliament.
4 At a Colloquium organized by the General Council of the Bar on 17 February 2006, the former
Chief Justice, Arthur Chaskalson and the current Chief Justice, Pius Langa, both expressed
their concerns with provisions that restricted the evolving model of judicial independence. On
the same day, veteran human rights lawyer, George Bizos SC made a public speech condemning
the Bills. ‘Judiciary under threat, Bizos says’ Business Day (20 February 2006).
5 Press Statement issued by Ms Fatima Chohan MP, Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee on
Justice and Constitutional Development, 27 February 2006. ‘Mbeki puzzled at judges’ criticism’
Business Day (23 February 2006).
6 B52 of 2003 (draft dated 19 October 2005).
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overstated in the media.7 Effective public comment was also made
difficult by the fact that the discussions on the Bills, held over a period of
several years between the judiciary and three successive Ministers of
Justice, had largely been held behind closed doors. Little was known
about either the justifications of government or the detail of the
judiciary’s opposition and its preferred alternatives. The revised versions
of the Bills were not made public until late 2005 and early 2006.
This note considers the constitutional and legal issues surrounding the
Constitution Amendment Bill. Although this is the fourteenth amend-
ment of the Constitution, it is the first time a constitutional amendment
has drawn such opposition from the legal and justice sector.8 In this
context, this note considers the extent to which constitutional amend-
ments may be challenged in our democracy, as well as the principles that
should guide public and legal debate. It then discusses the key concerns
around judicial independence and the separation of powers in the Bill.9
These are: the division of ‘judicial’ and ‘administrative’ functions in the
Bill; the prohibition on adjudicating on laws before they commence and
the appointment of judges-president and of acting judicial leadership.
Overall the note identifies within the Bill a pattern of executive power
encroaching upon the judiciary’s role. It concludes with comments on the
overall constitutionality of the amendment.
III THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
Constitutional amendments are not ordinary legislative amendments. In
recognition of this, s 74 of the Constitution provides for special
procedures and majorities. The procedure envisages special majorities
and public participation through the publication of an amendment for
comment, and the requirement that these comments are sent to the
Speaker of Parliament and the chairperson of the National Council of
Provinces for tabling in their respective Houses.10 A period of thirty days
must elapse before the amendment is put to the vote. This procedure was
put in place after the Constitutional Court declined to certify the first
draft of this part of the Constitution, and referred it back to the
7 For example, early press reports misinterpreted the provisions relating to the suspension on the
commencement of Acts of Parliament as eradicating an individual’s right to interim relief. See
Part IV below.
8 The floor-crossing amendments (the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Eighth and
Ninth Amendment Acts of 2002, discussed in United Democratic Movement v President of the
Republic of South Africa (No 2) 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC)), created similar concerns amongst
political commentators and political parties.
9 This note does not address a further area of contention in the Bills: the role of the
Constitutional Court as the apex court and the rationalisation of the system of appeals. See
Carole Lewis ‘Reaching the Pinnacle: Principles, Policies and People for a Single Apex Court in
South Africa’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 509.
10 Section 74(5) to (7).
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Constitutional Assembly for amendment to ensure compliance with
Constitutional Principle XV, namely that ‘amendments . . . shall require
special procedures involving special majorities’.11 Section 74(4) to (7) was
duly added and was approved by the Constitutional Court in the Second
Certification decision.12
Public participation in amending the Constitution is particularly
important in contemporary South Africa where the relatively recent
process of drafting the Constitution was an inclusive and participatory
process in which civil society was encouraged to make representations. In
addition, South Africa’s democracy is still in a process of establishment
and consolidation. Many will argue that it is too early to make
substantial changes to the text. This may be particularly true of the idea
of judicial independence which the Constitutional Court has described as
‘an evolving concept’.13 There is a danger that constitutional amend-
ments that are not sensitive to this may halt or reverse that evolution. As
discussed later, this has been the argument of some critics of the
Fourteenth Amendment Bill.
Some commentators have gone further to suggest that this means that
some of the amendments are unconstitutional.14 As discussed below,
whether that is correct will depend upon how one interprets the
Constitution and the amendments. However, beyond the technical
intricacies of constitutional interpretation, there are sound democratic
reasons why constitutional amendments should be avoided. These relate
to the place of the Constitution, as the supreme law of the land, in setting
rules, principles and standards of democracy that stand above day-to-day
politics and transient ruling elites. Too often (in Africa and elsewhere)
constitutional amendments have been used to serve the short-term
interests of those in power, to the detriment of society and longer-term
democratic goals. Even if the substance of an amendment is benign,
amendments remain a risk to democracy as they instil bad political habits
(regarding it as ‘normal’ to amend constitutions), tend to create
perceptions of manipulating constitutions to suit political ends (even if
this is not the intention or effect), and ultimately damage the legitimacy
of the Constitution and the strength of democracy.
Section 74 seeks to protect South Africa ‘against political agendas of
ordinary majorities’.15 It requires a period of publication and public
comment, ensures these comments reach Parliament and puts in place
11 Ex parte Chairperson of the National Assembly: In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa,1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) paras 151-156.
12 Ex parte Chairperson of the National Assembly: In Re: Certification of the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa,1996 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) paras 49-52.
13 Van Rooyen v S 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC) para 75.
14 Bizos (note 4 above).
15 First Certification decision (note 11 above) para 153.
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special majorities for amendments to key provisions, including the Bill of
Rights and s 1 which sets out the Republic’s founding values. The
Constitutional Court has twice considered the extent to which the
constitutional text is protected against amendment.16 Although it has
acknowledged that there is very limited scope for challenging amend-
ments that have complied with the constitutionally prescribed proce-
dure,17 this does not give Parliament carte blanche to amend the text. In
particular, the Court will look at whether the amendment affects the
basic structure of the Constitution, in which case it might not qualify as a
‘constitutional amendment’ at all.18 This is a stringent test, requiring the
amendment to undermine democracy itself and ‘effectively abrogate or
destroy’ the Constitution.19 Secondly, the Court will assess whether the
amendment affects the founding values of s 1, and thus requires a special
75 per cent majority in terms of s 74 (1). Here it does not interrogate
political choices, merely tests whether the amendment complies in general
terms with the values.20
The role of the Constitutional Principles has not been explicitly
addressed by the Constitutional Court since the First Certification
decision confirmed that certification meant that the question of
compliance of the text with the Principles could ‘never be raised again
in any court of law’.21 Whether they still have force as interpretative
principles is an open question.22 However, as principles, they contain
little detail, requiring merely that the judiciary shall be independent23 and
‘[t]here shall be separation of powers between the legislature, executive
and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure account-
ability, responsiveness and openness.’24 They do not prescribe the form
which this may take, and thus provide general protection to the principles
of democracy and not specific protection to a particular way of
16 Premier of KwaZulu-Natal v President of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (1) SA 769 (CC)
and the United Democratic Movement case (note 8 above).
17 In Premier of KwaZulu-Natal (ibid) the Court stated that an amendment is ‘constitutionally
unassailable’ if it follows the correct procedure. In addition, once an amendment is passed, it
cannot be challenged on the grounds of inconsistency with other provisions. The amended
constitution must be read as a whole, and the provisions in harmony with one another: United
Democratic Movement (note 8 above) para 12.
18 Premier of KwaZulu- Natal (note 16 above) para 47.
19 Ibid para 49.
20 United Democratic Movement (note 8 above).
21 First Certification decision (note 11 above) para 18. Whether the Constitutional Principles
could be raised in relation to later amendments to that text is arguably still an open question,
although, as argued in this note, it is likely that they have no independent role.
22 Goldstone J referred to their role as a ‘primary source of interpretation’ in argument in the
certification case. P Andrews & S Ellman (eds) The Post Apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives
on South Africa’s Basic Law (2001). This was not addressed in the United Democratic
Movement decision (note 8 above).
23 Constitutional Principle VII. The Principles are listed in Annexure 2, Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa Act, 200 of 1993.
24 Constitutional Principle VI, Annexure 2, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act,
200 of 1993.
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‘operationalising’ this principle. The Constitutional Principles do not add
greater protection than the ‘basic structure’ and ‘founding values’ tests,
which seem to have superseded the Principles. All three secure the basic
principles of democracy, including judicial independence and the
separation of powers. Perhaps the best way of understanding this is to
distinguish between amendments that affect that substance of a principle
or value from those that provide for alternate ways of implementing a
particular principle or value. The ‘basic structure’ and ‘founding values’
tests (read with or without the Constitutional Principles) provide
substantive protection to the democratic principles and values of the
Constitution — they cannot be eroded. However, the 75 per cent majority
permitted in relation to s 125 means that the Constitution can provide
alternate ways of implementing these principles, as long as they remain
intact. Political choices are permitted and protected, but these must be
within the parameters of the prescribed values and principles. Changes in
the form may not erode the substance. The difficulty here is that the line
between form and substance is not always clear.
In the following sections I will consider whether the Fourteenth
Amendment might be unconstitutional. In this discussion, it is assumed
that the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers,
although not specifically mentioned in s 1 of the Constitution, are
‘founding values’ (in addition to being Constitutional Principles). This is
based on the Constitutional Court’s finding that they are implicit in the
rule of law and foundational values of our democracy in s 1.26 In so far as
some of these amendments may be found to affect the implementation of
these principles, they will be at least subject to the 75 per cent majority
requirement of s 74(1). If they erode them, then they must be
unconstitutional.
At the time of writing, the issues are still in the realm of debate. Aside
from questions of constitutionality, how should South Africa deliberate
on constitutional amendment? What is the appropriate democratic
response of government and civil society to amendments that are
contested? I argue that the democratic principles of necessity and
justification should govern this debate. The Constitution envisages an
inclusive, participatory and accountable democracy. The democratic
imperative for this is even stronger when it comes to constitutional
amendment. The principle of necessity means that constitutional
amendments should be the last resort and should not be done merely
to provide clarification or detail. Such matters should be dealt with in
legislation where detail is possible and where they can be tested against
existing constitutional standards. Limiting amendments to what is
necessary promotes good governance, constitutional legitimacy and
25 Required by s 74(1).
26 Van Rooyen (note 13 above) 17.
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avoids perceptions of manipulation of the Constitution. Government
should justify the amendments as enhancing and not limiting the
democratic vision of the Constitution. In this case government should
demonstrate that the amendments are based on sound constitutional
justifications that promote the independence of the judiciary, maintain
the separation of powers, and improve the efficacy of the justice system
and the delivery of justice to all.
III THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY — AN EVOLVING CONCEPT
The independence of the judiciary is protected in s 165 of the
Constitution. This provides that ‘[t]he courts are independent and subject
only to the Constitution and to law’, ‘no person or organ of state may
interfere with the functioning of the courts’ and ‘organs of state must
assist and protect the courts to ensure their independence’.27 In other
words, it is the constitutional duty of the executive and legislature to
ensure the courts’ independence. The Constitution thus sets out clear and
broad principles on judicial independence. Over the past decade, both
judicial independence and the separation of powers have been given
further meaning through legislation, judicial interpretation and the
practice of the judiciary and the courts. For example, the Constitutional
Court Complementary Act 13 of 1995 gives the Chief Justice significant,
although not exclusive, authority over budget and staffing of the
Constitutional Court. The Minister appoints the Registrar of the
Constitutional Court and other officers on the Chief Justice’s request.28
The Chief Justice may appoint some staff (eg, research staff such as
clerks) and determine their remuneration and conditions of service in
consultation with the Department’s appointed accounting officer.29 The
Chief Justice requests funds, after consultation with the Minister, who
then approaches Parliament for such funds.30 This model is qualitatively
different from the apartheid model of ministerial authority that still
pertains in other courts.
The Constitutional Court has given jurisprudential content to the
principles of judicial independence and separation of powers in several
cases.31 These have confirmed that the principles have core meanings, but
that their precise meaning within any constitutional context is dependent
upon the history, circumstances and conventions.32 One needs to be
aware of the country’s complex reality, the ‘evolving patterns of its
constitutional developments’ and guided by the Constitution and its
27 Section 165(2)–(4).
28 Section 14(1).
29 Section 14(2).
30 Section 15.
31 De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC); SA Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath
2001 (1) SA 883 (CC); Van Rooyen (note 13 above).
32 De Lange v Smuts NO (note 31 above) paras 60–61.
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values.33 Both the Chief Justice and the previous Chief Justice have
referred to the evolving concept of judicial independence that is
developing in our context.34 An important question is whether this
evolution is merely one of form, or whether it is also a matter of building
the judiciary to meet the constitutional requirement of independence ‘in
substance’.
The Fourteenth Amendment Bill seems to affect this evolving concept
of independence of the judiciary in several ways. These include the
proposed system of administering the courts and the role of the Minister
in this respect,35 the ‘ouster clause’ which removes the jurisdiction of all
courts to hear a matter or make an order about the suspension of the
commencement of an Act of Parliament,36 the erosion of the authority of
the Chief Justice in respect of selecting acting Constitutional Court
Judges37 and the diminution of the authority of the Judicial Services
Commission in selecting judges president.38 Read across all these
provisions, the Bills suggest a reversal of the trends set in the past
decade and a pattern of creeping executive power at the expense of the
judiciary. While this is emphatically denied by the government39 (which
has professed a strong commitment to judicial independence and
transformation) it is difficult to escape the conclusion of a ‘nanny state’
stepping in to ‘fix up’ actual and perceived problems in the delivery of
justice.
IV THE SEPARATION OF THE ‘JUDICIAL’ AND THE ‘ADMINISTRATIVE’
FUNCTION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
The Bill seeks to amend s 165 of the Constitution by establishing the
Chief Justice as the ‘head of the judicial authority’ who ‘exercises
responsibility over the establishment and monitoring of norms and
standards for the exercise of the judicial function of all courts, other than
the adjudication of any matter before a court of law’. It also states that
the ‘Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice
exercises authority over the administration and budget of all courts’.40
This seeks to clarify the leadership role of the Chief Justice; and to draw a
line between the judicial function which falls within the jurisdiction of the
judiciary and the administration of the courts which is the responsibility
of the Department of Justice. The stated objective is to maintain and
entrench the ‘Commonwealth model of the separation of powers between
33 Van Rooyen (note 13 above) para 34.
34 Note 4 above.
35 Clause 1.
36 Clause 7(b).
37 Clause 10.
38 Clause 9(b).
39 Most recently by the President. See note 5 above.
40 Clause 1 of the Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill.
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the executive and judiciary’ in which the judicial function is the ‘sole
preserve’ of the judiciary and ‘responsibility for the administrative
functions of courts’ is the ‘sole preserve of the relevant Minister’.41
In reality, it is difficult to identify a ‘Commonwealth model’ on the
administration of justice and the appropriate role of the executive in this.
Little detail is provided in formal Commonwealth documents and
agreements beyond principled commitments to judicial independence,
and the need for security of tenure for judges and sufficient resources for
courts.42 Indeed, the recent Commonwealth conference inKenya called for
more detail on the role of the executive, whose position as main decision-
maker can hinder positive developments in accountability and the
relationship between the three branches.43 In practice, Commonwealth
countries have different models of managing the courts that include the
Courts Administration Service in Canadian federal courts that places the
courts’ administration ‘at arm’s length’ from the executive.44This is also the
situation in some Australian state courts.45 In other instances in Australia,
the Chief Justice or a group of judges are responsible for administration.46
In general, some have argued that the contemporary trend is for less, rather
than more, executive control over the administration of courts.
(a) Governance, accountability and the leadership role of the Chief Justice
The proposed s 165(6) reads:
The Chief Justice is the head of the judicial authority and exercises responsibility over
the establishment and monitoring of norms and standards for the exercise of the judicial
function of all courts, other than the adjudication of any matter before a court of law.
The judiciary is accountable for the efficient exercise of the judicial
function. Governance within, and accountability of, the judiciary are
important components of judicial independence and separation of powers
and may include practices such as publishing periodic reports of judicial
activities, simplified rules and procedure, public hearings, well-reasoned
judgments delivered within a reasonable time and a pro-active leadership
role of heads of the judiciary.47 The establishment of appropriate
41 Memorandum on the Objects of the Constitution Fourteenth Amendment Bill, para 1.
42 The Latimer House Principles set out the Commonwealth principles on the accountability of
and the relationship between the three branches of government: Commonwealth (Latimer
House) Principles on the Three Branches of Government (2002); available at <http://
www.thecommonwealth.org>. The Latimer House Guidelines are part of these. See Para II
under ‘Preserving Judicial Independence’.
43 The Pan African Forum on the Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles on the
Accountability and relationship between the three branches of Government. Communique´
Nairobi, Kenya, 4-6 April 2005.
44 Courts Administration Act, 2002.
45 See the Courts Administration Act, 1993 (South Australia).
46 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth).
47 Commonwealth Judicial Colloquium on Combating Corruption within the Judiciary Limassol
Conclusions (2002) para 12.5.
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leadership and of norms and standards for the exercise of the judicial
function is a sound democratic idea. In practice, the Chief Justice of
South Africa is already recognised as the head of the judiciary and the
judiciary has an evolving, if informal, model of collective leadership
where the heads of courts meet on important issues.
The constitutional recognition of the leadership role of the Chief
Justice does not preclude collective leadership nor is it an issue that
necessarily impedes upon the independence of the judiciary, although
concerns have been expressed by the judiciary about centralising too
much power in the Chief Justice.48 Nevertheless, together with improved
governance, clear leadership potentially enhances the functioning of the
judiciary. But even if acceptable in principle, it is not necessary to amend
a Constitution to achieve this. Nor is the current wording that places the
Chief Justice at the ‘head of the judicial authority’ justifiable. Judicial
authority of the Republic vests not in an individual but in the courts.49
Judicial authority is thus held by each and every judge within his or her
court and is secured by the independence of that judge in his or her court.
An individual cannot be the head of the judicial authority. He or she can
only be the head of the institution of judges, the judiciary.
The balance of the amendment relating to ‘responsibility for . . . norms
and standards’ is unclear. It might be read merely to refer to the
governance functions of the Chief Justice, without limiting other
functions, or it may be seen to limit the administrative role of the Chief
Justice (outside of the adjudicative function) to ‘the establishment and
monitoring of norms and standards for the exercise of the judicial
function’.50 This lack of clarity is, in itself, a problem. In addition, the
clause is unnecessary for governance purposes and unjustifiable on the
second interpretation. An independent judiciary, as guaranteed in the
Constitution, will have the power to establish norms and standards for
governance and accountability. It will do so in accordance with its own
model of leadership, not necessarily limited to the Chief Justice.51 The
details of governance are best left to practice or to legislation where they
may be subject to the constitutional test of judicial independence.52 The
problems with the second interpretation are addressed in the next section.
48 Memorandum on behalf of the Judiciary on the Bill (2005) part II para 6.
49 Section 165(1) of the Constitution.
50 This is the argument of the Legal Resources Centre (see Letter from the Legal Resources
Centre to the Portfolio Committee on Justice, 1 February 2006). However, there are differing
responses to this section by the LRC, the Human Rights Committee of the General Council of
the Bar ‘Update on Proposed Legislation concerning the Independence of the Judiciary’ (2005)
and Theunis Roux ‘ ‘‘Thinkpiece’’ for Seminar on the Constitution Fourteenth Amendment
Bill, 2005’ (2005).
51 The judiciary has argued against concentrating too much power in the person of the Chief
Justice. ‘Memorandum on Behalf of the Judiciary on the Bill’ (2005) part II para 6.
52 See the proposed cl 11 of the Superior Courts Bill.
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(b) The division of the judicial and administrative functions
The proposed amendment to s 165(6) and (7) of the Constitution seeks to
draw a line between the roles of the Chief Justice in relation to the judicial
function and the Minister who ‘exercises authority over the administra-
tion and budget of all courts’. Thus it seeks to entrench a constitutional
distinction between the role of the Chief Justice (judiciary) and the
Minister (executive) in the administration of justice. This has been subject
to strong criticism as affecting the independence of the judiciary and the
separation of powers.53 At the heart of the issue are three related
questions: Is there a clear line of distinction between the adjudicative and
administrative functions in the administration of justice? If so, is it
properly drawn in this amendment? Is the independence of judiciary
threatened if the executive ‘exercise[s] authority’ for finances and
administration of courts?
According to the Constitutional Court, institutional independence of
the judiciary means that the judiciary should have control over
‘matters that related directly to the exercise of the judicial function, as
well as judicial control over administrative functions ‘‘that bear
directly and immediately on the exercise of judicial function’’.’54 This
seems to envisage the possibility of a division, but raises the question
of how and where to draw this line between ‘judicial’ and ‘executive’
control. In principle, there are several ways of administering courts
that are compatible with an idea of judicial independence, ranging
from control within and by the judiciary, through administration by
an ‘independent service’ to a degree of control by the executive. As
discussed above, comparative systems show a variety of practices, but
with a trend towards developing an ‘arm’s length’ relationship with
government. In South Africa, in the past the Department of Justice
has been responsible for the administration of courts. This has begun
to change in the democratic era and the Constitutional Court was able
to obtain a greater degree of autonomy over its administration and
budget.
There are increasing arguments that the line drawn during the
apartheid era is now unconstitutional.55 In so far as this line can be said
to be entrenched by the amendment, it violates the concepts of judicial
independence and separation of powers as found in the Constitution
(stating that ‘no person or organ of state may interfere with the
functioning of the courts’)56 and as interpreted by the Constitutional
Court (as including judicial control of administrative functions
53 See in particular the Legal Resources Centre, note 50 above.
54 See Van Rooyen (note 13 above) para 29.
55 This is the argument of the Legal Resources Centre (note 50 above).
56 Section 165(3) of the Constitution. For argument on this see Legal Resources Centre (note 50
above) paras 2.5–2.7.
57 Legal Resources Centre (ibid).
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immediately related to the adjudicative function).57 The Legal
Resources Centre lists several instances in which the administration of
the courts is bound up with the adjudicative function, meaning that the
judiciary should exercise control over, eg, the office of the registrar, the
libraries and other court officials, such as translators.58 It has also been
noted that the fact that government is a party in many cases militates
against executive control of these administrative issues.59 In addition,
the amendment seems to claw back the partial autonomy that the
Constitutional Court has gained in relation to administration and
finances. This has led some to argue that the amendment seeks not only
to entrench the status quo, but also to legalise it. 60
The central problem is that the amendment does not take account of
the fact that our evolving model of judicial independence, in line with the
Constitution and international trends, is moving away from the system of
close executive administration practiced under apartheid. This evolving
model envisages at least partial judicial control, if not full autonomy,
over finances and administration. In this context, a constitutional
amendment that confers authority on the Minister alone for ‘the
administration and budget of all courts’, without qualification, is a
regressive move. It is also unconstitutional61 if it can be shown to retard
and erode the substance of the constitutionally approved concepts of
judicial independence and separation of powers, rather than just to
provide a constitutionally permissible political choice of the form of
judicial independence.
However, it can also be argued that the language of the amendment is
vague. Perhaps it can be read in harmony with a constitutional model
that vests ultimate authority in the Minister, but allows partial control
over certain functions to lie with the judiciary and the Chief Justice.
Certainly, one is bound to attempt to do this before declaring that it is
not constitutionally permissible.62 For example, the new s 165(7) would
have to be read in a way that preserves the spirit and intention of s 165 (3),
ie, that no person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of
the courts. Perhaps the amendment could be read down to permit the
establishment of an independent courts service that affords sufficient
58 These include the role of the registrar in granting default judgements, taxing bills of costs;
being an office for public correspondence; and general issuing of process and executing of
orders (note 50 above, paras 2.7.1; 2.7.2; 2.7.6; 2.7.7).
59 For example, by former Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson in an address to the General Council
of the Bar Meeting on the Judicial Bills, 17 February 2006.
60 In discussion with judges at the General Council of the Bar meeting, it was clear to me that
some felt that the amendment not only sought to prevent further claims for judicial autonomy,
but also that it was necessary to ‘constitutionalise’ the current system, which might be
unconstitutional under the current provisions and their judicial interpretation.
61 The Legal Resources Centre makes this argument on the basis of an interpretation of s 165(3).
See note 50 above, para 4.6.
62 The Constitutional Court has stated that amendments must be read in harmony with the
Constitution. United Democratic Movement (note 8 above) para 12.
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judicial control and operates at ‘arms length’ from the executive, even if
under its overall authority. But if this wording is capable of a benign
interpretation, that is no guarantee against future moves for greater
executive control. In this respect, the amendment continues to threaten
the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers.
In the end, it is the impasse between the executive and the judiciary
over this constitutional amendment that is the democratic problem.
Democratic dialogue rather than a stand-off is required. It has been
argued by government that the Minister should have responsibility in
terms of the Public Service Act and the Public Finance Act for the courts
and their personnel. Judges should not be employers or accounting
officers. It is not evident that judges are not asking for such control,
merely for a greater distance from the executive and for a greater say in
staffing, court management and budgets. It is also not inevitable that the
Minister or her director-general are the only possible responsible officers.
One could appoint an executive officer in a more independent courts
administration. While even that executive officer may be accountable to
the executive in terms of administration and finance — it will be much
more of an ‘arm’s length’ relationship.
The amendment is neither necessary nor justifiable. It is not necessary
for the development of an appropriate model of court administration that
can be set out in detail in legislation. The debate should thus be focussed
on the Superior Courts Bill. It is also not justified, either for the stated
reasons of commonwealth practice, or for wider constitutional or
political reasons. All it currently achieves is to add fuel to the argument
that these bills demonstrate a trend of executive curtailment of judicial
authority.
V CLAUSE 7 — CHALLENGES TO ACTS OF PARLIAMENT BEFORE THEY
COMMENCE
Clause 7 of the Amendment Bill adds a new provision to s 172 of the
Constitution to place an absolute prohibition on any court adjudicating a
matter dealing with the suspension of an Act of Parliament before it has
commenced:
Despite any other provision of this Constitution, no court may hear a matter dealing with
the suspension of, or make an order suspending, the commencement of an Act of
Parliament or a provincial Act.
This amendment was initially reported in the media to be a substantial
erosion of the court’s power to grant interim relief.63 It is not necessarily
so. It is rare that a litigant would wish to challenge legislation before it is
in force, as the matter might not be ‘ripe’ for hearing under such
63 This appeared to be the initial view of IDASA and the General Council of the Bar according to
press reports.
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circumstances, and the commencement of an Act seldom immediately
interferes with rights.64 In addition, the amendment does not prevent a
court from offering interim relief in the form of suspending the operation,
rather than the commencement of, an Act. If there was a matter of
invasion of rights, it would be possible to approach the court on an
urgent basis on the day that the Act, or part of it, comes into force.65
The problem with this amendment is that it constitutes an ouster
clause, against the spirit of the Constitution that removes the jurisdiction
of the courts in an area where they have arguably shown appropriate
deference to the role of the legislature in enacting laws and to government
in determining policy. It also removes an important counter-majoritarian
measure set out in ss 80 and 122 of the Constitution which allows one-
third of the members of Parliament or a provincial legislature to refer an
Act directly to the Constitutional Court for review. These are the only
sections that explicitly deal with challenges to Acts that have not
commenced and where an interim order may effectively suspend the
commencement of an Act.66
The powers of courts to deal with Acts that have not yet commenced
was partly addressed by the Constitutional Court in the third of its
United Democratic Movement decisions.67 In this case the Court assumed
that the High Court had jurisdiction to suspend an Act of Parliament,
either before or after it was published.68 It then set out a test for the
provision of interim relief in relation to official action in terms of an Act
that was subject to constitutional challenge. This test is likely to form a
minimum test for the more drastic remedy of suspending the commence-
ment of an Act. This relief was narrowly construed and appreciative of
the legislature’s role. The elements of this are (i) that action pursuant to
the Act is imminent; (ii) it is in the interests of justice; (iii) the relief is
absolutely necessary to avoid irreparable harm; and (iv) it must be
construed in the least intrusive manner possible with due regard to the
interests of others who might be affected by the impugned legislation.69
The proposed amendment means that interim relief, even under the
above conditions, is ousted. Final relief is not possible, allowing the
President to bring into being unconstitutional legislation before it is
struck down. Counter-majoritarian measures are rendered meaningless.
64 President of the Republic of South Africa v United Democratic Movement 2003 (1) SA 472 (CC)
para 28. The issue of suspension was considered in this case and in National Gambling Board
v Premier, Kwazulu-Natal 2002 (2) SA 715 (CC) para 54. In neither case was it found necessary
to make a finding on the courts’ powers in relation to suspension of the commencement of an
Act.
65 See Roux (note 50 above).
66 United Democratic Movement (note 64 above) para 27.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid para 27.
69 Ibid paras 28-31.
138 (2006) 22 SAJHR
In the constitutional and jurisprudential context of strictly tailored relief, this
amendment seems neither necessary nor justifiable. If government is worried
about unnecessary delays to the implementation of progressive legislation,
this is not expressed nor is it amajor concernunder the current jurisprudence
which provides for tightly constructed relief. If the clause reflects a concern
about the appropriateboundary linesbetween the judiciaryand the executive
or between the judiciary and the legislature, the Constitutional Court is the
chosen referee in our constitutional democracy
The fundamental problem with this amendment is that it evinces a kind
of mistrust of the judiciary. Despite the careful and ‘responsible’
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, the government sees fit to
oust jurisdiction. It is a worrying trend throughout the amendment bill.
In any choice between giving power to, or leaving power with, the
judiciary — the government chooses to take the power itself. In small
strokes the line separating the powers is redrawn. It is in this subtle, but
quite fundamental, way that judicial independence is threatened.
VI CLAUSE 9 — THE APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY
JUDGES PRESIDENT
Section 9 of the amendment Bill proposes the introduction of a new
provision to s 174 of the Constitution providing for the President to
appoint the judges-president and deputy judges-president from a list
provided by the Judicial Services Commission (JSC), after consulting the
Chief Justice and the Minister (in a similar manner to the appointment of
Constitutional Court judges).70 Currently this is not required by the
Constitution, and the practice (which was in place before the 1996
Constitution) has been for judges-president to be chosen by the JSC,
probably under an extended reading of s 174(6), where the President
appoints judges on the advice of the JSC. To what extent does this
proposed amendment interfere with the doctrine of separation of powers
and the independence of the judiciary?
When faced with question of executive involvement in the appointment
of judges during the certification of the Constitution, the Constitutional
Court said the following:
The mere fact . . . that the executive makes or participates in the appointment of judges is
not inconsistent with the doctrine of the separation of powers or with judicial
independence required by CP VII. In many countries in which there is an independent
judiciary and separation of powers, judicial appointments are made either by the
executive or Parliament or by both. What is crucial to the separation of powers and the
independence of the judiciary is that the judiciary should enforce the law impartially and
that it should function independently of the legislature and the executive.71
70 In addition, it is not necessarily possible to find four candidates for the position of judge-
president, as required by this procedure.
71 First Certification decision (note 11 above) para 123.
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If, as a general principle, executive involvement in appointment does not
violate the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary,
what are the considerations in assessing whether this amendment is
necessary or justifiable? Again it is important to turn to the evolving
nature of our democracy, and the fact that South Africa has began to
consolidate a particular view of the judiciary, the nature of its
appointments and the role of the executive, JSC and Chief Justice.
Constitutional practice has evolved over the past eleven years to give the
JSC this role, and to allow the Chief Justice, as chair of this body, to
shape the judicial leadership. The proposal can be seen to diminish the
role of the JSC which was created to provide for an independent and
depoliticised selection of judges in an open, transparent and accountable
process. It also weakens the influence of the Chief Justice in selecting the
leadership of the institution that he represents and for whose efficiency he
is accountable.
Of course, it may be argued that while JSC has successfully
transformed the judicial leadership from a race perspective, it has failed
to appoint women as judges and to positions of leadership.72 By contrast,
President Mbeki has an impressive record of appointing women to
positions of leadership. Would the President not do a better job of
transformation? He might. But this fact is irrelevant. As a matter of
principle, one cannot amend the Constitution because the current
President makes more representative appointments. The issue is what
should be the balance of power in appointments over the long term. In
this respect, the current position is better for democracy. It ‘trusts’ the
institutions that currently have a significant role in appointments. It
recognises the important role of the judges president in relation to the
court roll, and avoids any suspicion that the President’s appointees may
manipulate the assigning of judges to specific cases, an issue about which
there have been particular sensitivities in the past twelve months.73 In
sum, the practices of selection of judicial leadership that have evolved in
our democracy have been effective (if not comprehensive) in transforma-
tion, achieve a good balance between the roles of the President (who also
nominates several JSC members), the Chief Justice and JSC, and prevent
the abuse of power of any one institution or person. Where there have
been shortcomings, as in the appointment of women, it is democratically
better to retain an open process. Transparency and advocacy by civil
society and human rights organisations on this issue must be seen as the
necessary check and balance to inadequate selection procedures.
It is difficult to find a constitutional justification for this change. The
current process affirms democracy and transparent and accountable
72 See C Rickard ‘Judging Women Harshly’ Sunday Times (23 October 2005).
73 In this respect, the fact that this method is the same as the appointment of Constitutional
Court judges means little. Judges President play a different role in the judiciary, one that calls
for an arm’s length appointment process.
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selections. Presidential decisions are, by their nature, far less transpar-
ent. Shifting power to the executive, however small in practice, is not
justified.
VII CLAUSE 10 — ACTING APPOINTMENTS OF CERTAIN JUDGES
The Bill seeks to amend s 175 of the Constitution in relation to the
appointment of judges in acting positions of leadership. The President
will have sole discretion to appoint acting judges of the Constitutional
Court, as well as acting judges in the position of deputy Chief Justice,
deputy president of the SCA and the deputy judges-president, after
consulting with various parties. In both instances, there is a shift in power
towards the executive.
(a) Acting judges in the Constitutional Court
Currently, acting Constitutional Court judges must be appointed with the
concurrence of the Chief Justice. There is no necessary and justifiable
reason for the President now to have sole discretion in appointing these
judges. On the contrary, there are sound arguments against it. The role of
the Constitutional Court in holding government to account means that
Government is often a party in the Constitutional Court. Given that
acting appointments are for a defined and known period, when the court
roll may also be known, it is undesirable that the President has the final
say, and may lead to perceptions that the executive, in theory or in
practice, is able to interfere with the Court. This is exacerbated by the
increasing tendency of the Court to give split decisions, meaning that it is
possible that the appointment of a single judge can have a material
impact on the nature of its decisions.
In the First Certification judgement, when the method of the
appointing acting Constitutional Court judges was challenged, the
Constitutional Court said the following:
[S]uch appointments (are) made by the President on the recommendation of the Minister
acting with the concurrence of the President of the Constitutional Court and the Chief
Justice. All three are members of the JSC and the requirement that there be agreement
between them as to the person to be appointed meets any reasonable concern that the
power of an acting Constitutional Court judge might be abused.74
The proposed amendment shifts this balance to the executive and thus
interferes with the balance of powers as endorsed by the Constitutional
Court. On this basis it must be seen to contravene the original
Constitutional Principles on which the Court’s decision was made,
interfering with both judicial independence and the separation of powers.
74 Note 11 above, para 130.
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 141
Arguably, this is interference in substance rather than form, affecting the
basic structure of the separation of powers and, as such, is impermissible.
(b) Acting judicial leadership
The amendment also provides that the President should appoint those
who act as the Deputy Chief Justice, the deputy president of the SCA and
the deputy judge president of a Division of the High Court. This is not
specifically dealt with in the Constitution which only refers to the power
of the Minister to appoint acting judges. The Constitution Court
Complementary Act refers to the President appointing the deputy Chief
Justice at the request of the Chief Justice.
Acting positions of leadership are important as they impact of the
efficacy and direction of the court, as well as succession issues. For this
reason, the decision should not be in the hands of one person. A balance
should be struck between the executive, the Chief Justice and Deputy
Chief Justice and the head of the court concerned. In other words, for
similar reasons to those set out above, a wider consultation and selection
process seem necessary, and the change in appointment seems neither
necessary nor justifiable.
VII CONCLUSION
I have argued that several of the provisions in the Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment Bill demonstrate a worrying trend of the
executive redrawing the lines of judicial independence and the separation
of powers. In each case, that line is shifted in favour of the executive. This
gives rise to concerns that the government does not sufficiently ‘trust’ the
judiciary to continue develop into a legitimate, accountable and efficient
institution. It also feeds into perceptions that government will step in to
‘fix’ things by extending its sphere of control or failing to relinquish it
where appropriate. The resultant creeping centralisation of power,
however slight, narrows the democratic vision of the Constitution and
ends up shifting the separation of powers and tampering with judicial
independence.
Many in civil society can point to problems in the judiciary and the
administration of justice. Some of that lies at the door of government and
some is the responsibility of the judiciary. For example, many in the
profession will agree that the Rules Board has not been efficient in its
rule-making task. The solution is not to transfer rule-making power to
the executive as the Superior Courts Bill seeks to do,75 but rather to
ensure that the judiciary has the capacity and the resources to ensure that
its rule making power functions efficiently. The solution is to build
democratic institutions and not to limit them.
75 Superior Courts Bill, cl 41.
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In some instances, especially in relation to the separation of the judicial
and administrative functions in clause 1 and the appointment of acting
Constitutional Court judges, the amendments may affect the substance
and not merely the form of judicial independence and the separation of
powers. This raises the spectre of a constitutional challenge to a
constitutional amendment. This is also not good for democracy,
especially when it entails two of its fundamental institutions.
The constitutional imperative to restructure the courts in line with the
new Constitution needs to be carried out in a manner that engages the
institutions of the state in a democratic dialogue that has the establish-
ment of an independent, accountable and efficient judiciary as its goal.
This entails breaking away from the current impasse and the executive
instinct of constraining judicial institutional development. The executive,
the judiciary and civil society need to engage publicly to agree on a vision
of an independent and accountable judiciary and work, collectively,
towards its achievement.
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